	Case 3:03-cv-00306-LRH-VPC Document 58 Filed 08/08/06 Page 1 of 5
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6	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
7	DISTRICT OF NEVADA
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9	ROBERT J. COLLINS, )
10	Petitioner, ) Case No. 3:03-cv-00306-LRH-VPC
11	vs ) ORDER
12	AL HERRERA, et al.,
13	Respondents.
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15	Before the court are Petitioner's Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (Docket #7),
16	Respondents' Answer (Docket #29), Petitioner's Rebuttal to Respondents' Answer (Docket #52),
17	Respondents' Reply to Petitioner's Rebuttal of Respondents' Answer (Docket #55), and Petitioner's
18	Reply and Rebuttal of Respondents' Reply to Petitioner's Rebuttal of Respondents' Answer (Docket
19	#56). For the reasons stated below, the court finds that many of Petitioner's federal habeas claims
20	remain unexhausted.
21	A federal court will not grant a state prisoner's petition for habeas relief until the prisoner
22	has exhausted his available state remedies for all claims raised. <i>Rose v. Lundy</i> , 455 U.S. 509 (1982);
23	28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). A petitioner must give the state courts a fair opportunity to act on each of his
24	claims before he presents those claims in a federal habeas petition. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838,
25	844 (1999); See also Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995). A claim remains unexhausted until
26	the petitioner has given the highest available state court the opportunity to consider the claim through

direct appeal or state collateral review proceedings. *See Casey v. Moore*, 386 F.3d 896, 916 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2004); *Garrison v. McCarthey*, 653 F.2d 374, 376 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1981).

A habeas petitioner must "present the state courts with the same claim he urges upon the federal court." *Picard v. Connor*, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971). The federal constitutional implications of a claim, not just issues of state law, must have been raised in the state court to achieve exhaustion. *Ybarra v. Sumner*, 678 F.Supp. 1480, 1481 (D. Nev. 1988) *citing Picard*, 404 U.S. at 276. To achieve exhaustion, the state court must be "alerted to the fact that the prisoner [is] asserting claims under the United States Constitution" and given the opportunity to correct alleged violations of the prisoner's federal rights. *Duncan v. Henry*, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995), *See Hiivala v. Wood*, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999). It is well settled that 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) "provides a simple and clear instruction to potential litigants: before you bring any claims to federal court, be sure that you first have taken each one to state court." *Jiminez v. Rice*, 276 F.3d 478, 481 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001), *quoting Rose v. Lundy*, 455 U.S. 509, 520 (1982).

A claim is not exhausted unless the petitioner has presented to the state court the same operative facts and legal theory upon which his federal habeas claim is based. *Bland v. California Dept. Of Corrections*, 20 F.3d 1469, 1473 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1994). The exhaustion requirement is not met when the petitioner presents to the federal court facts or evidence which place the claim in a significantly different posture that it was in the state courts, or where different facts are presented at the federal level to support the same theory. *See Nevius v. Sumner*, 852 F.2d 463, 470 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1988); *Pappageorge v. Sumner*, 688 F.2d 1294, 1295 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1982); *Johnstone v. Wolff*, 582 F.Supp. 455, 458 (D.C.Nev. 1984).

In the present case, many, if not all of Petitioner's federal habeas claims remain unexhausted.

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## A. Ground 1

Ground 1 of Petitioner's federal habeas petition alleges that Petitioner's 5<sup>th</sup>, 6<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup> Amendment rights to confront witnesses were violated when he was never informed that a key state witness, his ex-wife, had undergone hypnosis prior to testifying. Although Petitioner claims in his petition that he exhausted this ground through his direct appeal, and in a first and second post-conviction petition, a review of the record demonstrates that Petitioner has never presented this ground in state court. Ground 1 is therefore unexhausted.

## B. Ground 7

Ground 7 of Petitioner's federal habeas petition alleges that his 6<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup>

Amendment rights to a fair trial were violated when the trial court refused to allow Petitioner to present impeachment evidence regarding the arresting officer's history on the police force. Once again, Petitioner claims he presented this ground for relief to the Nevada Supreme Court in a direct appeal, and a first and second post-conviction petition. And once again, a review of the record demonstrates that Petitioner has not presented this ground in state court. Ground 7 is unexhausted.

## C. Ground 6

Ground 6 of Petitioner's federal habeas petition alleges that his 5<sup>th</sup>, 6<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup>

Amendment rights to a fair trial were violated when the court failed to give various jury instructions.

Although Petitioner did present a similar claim in his direct appeal in state court, the claim was based solely on state law and did not raise any federal constitutional issues. Because Petitioner failed to present the allegations in Ground 6 to the Nevada Supreme Court as a federal constitutional claim, Ground 6 is unexhausted.

## D. Ground 3

Ground 3 of Petitioner's federal habeas petition alleges that his 14<sup>th</sup> Amendment right to due process was violated because there is no law that makes it illegal to record what one can hear with the naked ear in a public place. Like Ground 6, this ground was presented in a similar fashion

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to the Nevada State courts, but not as a federal constitutional claim. Because Petitioner presented the allegations in Ground 3 to the Nevada Supreme Court only as a state law claim, it is unexhausted.

Federal courts cannot consider petitions containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515-516 (1982), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), Szeto v. Rusen, 709 F.2d 1340, 1341 (9th Cir. 1983). Because Petitioner's federal habeas petition contains both potentially exhausted and unexhausted claims, this court will provide Petitioner with the following two options: Petitioner may elect to (1) voluntarily abandon his unexhausted grounds (Grounds 1, 3, 6, and 7) and proceed on the remaining grounds (Grounds 2, 4, and 5), or (2) voluntarily dismiss the entire petition, without prejudice, to return to state court to exhaust his unexhausted claims. If Petitioner elects the second option, to return to state court, this court will order this case dismissed without prejudice and administratively closed, but will not enter judgment. After exhausting his grounds for relief in state court, Petitioner may make a motion to reopen this action under the same case number and before the same undersigned District Judge. If Petitioner fails to elect one of the two options during the time provided by this order, his case may be dismissed with prejudice.

Additionally, Petitioner is advised that it is his burden to demonstrate that all of his claims have been properly exhausted in state court. Respondents vaguely asserted in their Answer that parts of Grounds 2, 4 and 5 may also be unexhausted. Although this court's initial review of Grounds 2, 4, and 5 indicates that those grounds appear at first glance to be exhausted, Petitioner should take note that Respondents have not waived the issue of exhaustion on any of the remaining claims. If Petitioner chooses to abandon Grounds 1, 3, 6, and 7 and proceed on Grounds 2, 4, and 5, it will remain Petitioner's burden to prove to the court that he has properly exhausted those remaining grounds.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Petitioner shall have thirty (30) days to do one of the following: (1) inform this court in a sworn declaration that he wishes to formally and

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forever abandon the grounds for relief set out in Grounds 1, 3, 6 and 7 of his federal habeas petition, 1 2 and proceed only on the remaining grounds for relief; or (2) inform this court in a sworn declaration 3 that he wishes to dismiss this petition without prejudice in order to return to state court to exhaust his 4 unexhausted claims. 5 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if Petitioner elects to return to state court to 6 exhaust his state court remedies, this case will be dismissed without prejudice and administratively 7 closed, but judgment will not be entered. After exhausting his state court remedies, Petitioner may 8 file a motion to reopen this case using the same case number and before the same undersigned 9 District Judge. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if Petitioner elects to abandon his unexhausted 10 11 grounds, Respondent shall have thirty (30) days from the date Petitioner serves his declaration of abandonment in which to file an answer or response to Petitioner's remaining grounds for relief. 12 13 Petitioner shall thereafter have twenty (20) days following service of Respondent's answer in which 14 to file a reply. 15 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if Petitioner fails to respond to this order in the time permitted, this case may be dismissed without prejudice. 16 Dated this 8<sup>th</sup> day of August, 2006. 17 18 Elsihe 19 20 21 22 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 23 24 25 26